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ABSTRACT
The Theory of the Firm, The Theory of Competition,
and The Transnational Corporation (TNC)

JEL F23
Coase’s 1937 paper on “The Nature of the Firm” formed the basis
of the transaction-cost and internalization theories of
transnational enterprises in the 1970s-1990s. These emphasized
the problem of firms transferring intangible assets across
national borders. Newer theories of the firm adopt resourcebased Penrosian, knowledge-based, capabilities and evolutionary
perspectives, yet most continue to explain the international firm
as a function of transaction-cost economizing. It is argued that
Coase’s intention was to present a theory of the firm abstracted
from its competitive environment. The application of this
approach to a theory of the TNC is flawed because it cannot
explain the TNC without reference to competitive conditions.
This leaves us with incomplete theories of multinational firms in
their competitive environments, because they address transactioncost problems and solutions to the exclusion of many other
competitive considerations that must influence the transnational
step in the firm’s evolution. The newer knowledge-based theories
of the firm represent progress because they focus on the
institutional details of dynamic firm creation of (investment in)
the intangible or knowledge-based competitive assets by which
firms transform their environments. For international firms,
this has global consequences. Most recently, theory has begun to
emphasize the advantages and not just the costs of
internationalization. Additionally, the necessity to address the
juxtaposition of internalization and externalization by global
firms provides a context for creating a dynamic explanation of
both. The key is to recognize the process of standardization as
a part of the process of innovation at the heart of learningbased theories. This can help to explain the hierarchical
division of labor both within and between firms.
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DRAFT
The Theory of the Firm, The Theory of Competition,
and The Transnational Corporation

The theory of the firmi, whether based on transaction-cost
or on evolutionary and knowledge-based analysis, has provided the
basis for constructing most of the theoretical treatments of the
transnational corporation (TNC)ii since at least 1960.

This

practice has had the result too often of focusing attention on a
narrow set of parameters for defining and explaining the
international firm. The parameters examined usually explain how
global efficiency is improved through the international firm’s
ownership and direction of productive assets in more than one
country.

Both transactions-cost economics (TCE) and evolutionary

theories of the firm have added immeasurably to the understanding
of the multinational corporation, but the focus often excludes
the analysis of business strategy and how firms compete to
transform themselves and their environments in order to continue
their productive operations successfully.
It is argued here that the theory of the firm initiated in
Coase’s 1937 paper was an attempt to explain the functions of a
firm abstracted from its competitive environment.

Coase’s
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explanation was based upon the comparative efficiencies of
coordinating resource allocation within a private profit-seeking
hierarchical institution or through markets.iii

When transaction-

cost analysis was later extended to provide a theory of the TNC,
especially during the 1950s to 1980s, Coase’s methodology was
largely adopted, but inappropriately, it is argued here.

The

evolutionary and knowledge-based theories of the firm that became
more prominent in the 1980s to the present created a more complex
and dynamic picture of the functions of the firm, but mostly
retained transaction-cost reasoning to explain the TNC until very
recently.
The purpose of this paper is not to deny that
transaction costs can be one among many explanations for foreign
direct investment (FDI).

The development of the concept has

provided a great service in contributing to the analysis of the
TNC and in generating a large literature devoted to the
organization and activities of the firm and the TNC.

The view

presented here is that transaction-cost-based theories provide an
insufficient theoretical platform for explaining the
multinational enterprise.

The knowledge- or learning-based

theories present a more fitting approach to the extent that they
abandon the excessively narrow focus on the transaction costs of
transferring knowledge assets to foreign productive operations.
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Recent work places more emphasis on the advantages to be obtained
by international production and less on its costs.

A dynamic

method that abandons the static, constrained-optimization
approach emphasizes the extent to which firms’ investments are
undertaken to transform their environments, including any
constraints such as transaction costs, but more broadly as well.
In the case of international production, this takes on global
consequences.

The need to address the simultaneous

externalization of some productive operations and increasing
concentration of resources inside global firms presents the
opportunity to further develop the theory of competition by
recognizing the process of standardization as a part of the
process of innovation.

It also highlights the necessity of

focusing more attention on the TNC’s control over resources
outside its ownership boundaries through sub-contracting,
outsourcing and other contractual arrangements. Finally,
understanding the connection between internalization and
externalization helps to further develop the nature of the
hierarchical division of labor within and between firms, a topic
mostly absent from the theory of the firm and the TNC.
The organization of this paper is as follows.

Section I

briefly recaps the methodology of Coase’s 1937 theory of the
firm.

Sections II and III review the extension of Coase’s theory
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to analysis of the TNC by Hymer, Buckley & Casson, and
Williamson.

Section IV develops the methodological error at the

heart of a transaction-cost-based theory of the TNC.

Section V

introduces the newer evolutionary, learning-based theories of the
firm, most of which continue to explain the international firm as
a product of transaction-cost economizing.

More recent

literature examining the advantages of internationalized
production and the juxtaposition of internalization and
externalization by global firms provides a context for creating a
dynamic explanation of both.

Concluding remarks appear in

Section VI.

I. COASE
Ronald Coase’s 1937 paper on “The Nature of the Firm” was
widely acclaimed in the 1970s through the 1990s as an
institutionalist theory of the firm to replace the unsatisfactory
neoclassical model described variously as a “black box” or a
production function.
Coase explained the firm as a superior institution for
allocating productive resources when alloction through markets
involves transaction costs.

Thus, the cost of market

transactions with other agents can be reduced by forming a
private group of individuals whose productive exchanges within
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the group are governed by hierarchical instead of arm's-length
relations.

The firm is said to "internalize" transactions that

are more costly if arranged through markets.

However, as the

firm grows through internalization, the costs of organizing
transactions within the firm rise.

Therefore, the boundaries of

the firm and the limit to firm size are determined by marginal
analysis:
At the margin, the costs of organizing
within the firm will be equal either to
the costs of organizing in another firm or
to the costs involved in leaving the
transaction to be "organized" by the price
mechanism. ...This gives the equilibrium for
static analysis [404].
Although Coase is critical of the neoclassical approach to
the firm, here he places analysis of the firm squarely within the
static, constrained optimization methodology of neoclassical
economics.

This approach constitutes a theory of the firm

abstracted from its competitive environment, since there could be
any number of competitive reasons for a firm to extend its
ownership boundaries, for example, the enlargement of its market
share or exclusive control over scarce inputs.

Thus, we have a

theory of the firm created at a higher level of abstraction than
a theory of competition.

Application of this approach is widely

adopted in the modern theory of multinational business.
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III. TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE EARLY THEORY OF THE TNC: HYMER,
BUCKLEY AND CASSON

In the early post-World War II period, Stephen Hymer
(1976)iv and Charles Kindleberger (1969) fashioned an
institutionalist treatment of the international firm that heavily
influenced subsequent theory.

It is worthwhile here to review

briefly Hymer’s framework, which was later split into the
separate transactions-cost-economics (primarily associated with
Oliver Williamson) and internalization (primarily associated with
Buckley and Casson, and Dunning) approaches to the MNC.
The research questions posed by Hymer were: (1) How does a
firm engage in foreign production successfully, given the assumed
competitive advantages of local firms in the host countryv

and

(2) Why does a firm engage in foreign production instead of
selling or licensing to a host-country firm the patent or
technology or other asset underlying the final product it wishes
to sell in the foreign country?

Note that, in posing this second

question, Hymer assumed that TNCs exist to transfer usually
intangible assets to a foreign production location.

This

assumption has been maintained in most theories of the TNC, at
least until very recently.

Hymer’s assumption was undoubtedly

based on the observed transfer of new management techniques to
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Europe by US multinationals during the post-World War II period.
Typically, a manufacturing firm is assumed, although the same
theories have been applied to FDI in services (Jones 2005:
chapter 5).
Hymer's answer to the first question was that some firms had
developed "advantages" vis-a-vis other firms that would act to
offset the location advantages enjoyed by local firms in the host
country.

Such firm-specific advantages could include patents,

better or cheaper access to important factors of production,
brand names, economies of scale, and the like (Hymer 1976: 4146).

When these advantages were not easily acquired or imitated

by local firms in the home or host country, the advantaged firm
could profitably exploit its unique assets in a foreign country
in competition with local firms.

Such advantages became known as

“ownership advantages” in Dunning’s OLI paradigm (1993).vi
Hymer's answer to the second question was that imperfections
in markets lead firms in concentrated industries to engage in
foreign production to achieve one or two goals primarily:

(1) to

remove competition among enterprises located in different
countries, and/or (2) to appropriate the maximum possible rents
which could accrue to the firm's unique assets.
In discussing why a firm wishing to maximize rents would
choose foreign production over licensing, he referred to Coase's
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theory of the firm, if not by name:
Why does a firm use the advantage itself
instead of licensing it? ... The firm is a
practical institutional device which substitutes
for the market. The firm internalizes or
supersedes the market. A fruitful approach to
our problem is to ask why the market is an inferior
method of exploiting the advantage; that is, we
look at imperfections in the market [1976: 47-48].
For example, Hymer explained that uncertainty can lead to a
"conflict of evaluations" between the owner of the advantage and
the licensee:
The owner of the advantage may use it
himself because his evaluation of it is different
from the evaluation of other people because
he has more information about his advantage
.... [1976: 50]
Note that in Hymer’s hands, Coase’s metholology reappears, but
the existence of the firm is now assumed, and the geographical
extent of its boundaries is the focus.

In addition to the

problem of asymmetric information, Hymer explained that
uncertainty makes it difficult to construct a contract that
satisfactorily anticipates and makes provision for unforeseen
events (1976: 50).
These examples anticipate the types of market failure giving
rise to high contracting costs under transaction-cost-based
theory developed in the 1970s.

But Hymer did not limit his

discussion of market imperfections to the problem of contracting
costs.

He also identified “imperfections” that could prevent the
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advantaged firm from maximizing monopolistic/oligopolistic
profits in a licensing situation:
The second problem of licensing arises from
the difficulty of controlling price and output.
To achieve maximum profits, a firm which licenses
must specify the precise use to each firm, and this
is not always possible under the antitrust laws.
Alternatively, it could let the firms compete,
but this may result in a loss of profits. If
the firm which possesses the advantage does not
license but instead undertakes the operations itself,
there is less difficulty in achieving maximum
profits [1976: 49].
Market imperfections here are defined from the point of view of
the MNE, not from the perspective of economic efficiency.

Hymer

noted also that licensing could lead to a loss or accelerated
loss of the licensor's advantage to the licensee.

This danger

could be forestalled by foregoing licensing in favor of foreign
production.

The key point here is that Hymer predicted

"internalization" of international exchanges of intermediate
knowledge-based products for the purpose of reducing contracting
costs, as well as for maintaining monopolistic or oligopolistic
advantages and maximizing rents on the basis of barriers to
entry.

Hymer’s focus on the transfer of assets from an MNC to

its international affiliates, i.e., “internalization” as opposed
to a transfer of assets through a market interface, has remained
the focus of the theoretical analysis of the TNC’s primary
function until very recently.
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Hymer believed that the process of internationalization
would lead to a smaller number of competing firms and thus a
reduction in worldwide competition in the tradeoff between size
of the firm and the number of firms.

At the same time, he

believed that TNCs present the possibility of greater efficiency
in the global transfer of technology, capital and organizational
skills (Hymer 1976: 221; Hymer 1970).vii

In other words, Hymer's

explanation of international production combined efficiencyenhancing with efficiency-reducing factors.

While Coase’s

influence is obvious, Hymer adds the competitive perspective of
firms operating in oligopolistic industries.

Thus, Hymer’s

theory of the TNC predicts that the extent of its geographic
boundaries are affected by competitive considerations.

This is

not a theory of the TNC abstracted from its competitive
environment.

Coase’s ideas are adopted, but Hymer assumes that

competitive conditions, and thus strategy, help to explain the
international firm.
Hymer’s dual approach (efficiency-enhancing and efficiencyreducing) reappeared in Buckley and Casson’s (1976) development
of an internalization theory of the TNC, presented as a special
case of the multi-plant firm.

As in Hymer’s work, the focus is

on the geographical ownership boundaries of the firm.

Buckley

and Casson (B&C) did not mention “transaction costs,” but
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referred to market imperfections that generate benefits from
extending common ownership over several “interdependent
activities linked by flows of intermediate products . . .,”
crediting Coase (B&C 1976: 36, n. 2).

B&C listed several types

of imperfection (from the firm’s perspective) that could be
ameliorated by internalization, including (1) instances in which
discriminatory pricing is not feasible (thus reducing
possibilities for exploitation of market power); (2) bilateral
concentration of market power; (3) asymmetric information
regarding the nature or value of the product; and (4) barriers to
trade or capital flows, and international variations in tax rates
(pp. 37-38).
This attention to both efficiency and market power
considerations has continued to the present in contemporary
internalization theory (e.g., Kay 1999) and in the work of
international-trade theorists who address the MNE.

An example of

the latter is Markusen (1995, 2002), who creates a model in which
the advantaged firm becomes a multinational rather than a
licensor when knowledge capital is easily appropriable by a
licensee; the concern is with the loss of future rents from a
proprietary-knowledge asset.
1989.)

(See also Horstmann and Markusen

The internalization theory of the international firm is

thus influenced by Coase, but does not address the TNC abstracted
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from its competitive environment.

III. WILIAMSON’S TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY
OF THE TNC
Williamson’s theoretical work on the international firm
(1975, 1981, 1985) is built on his transaction-cost-economicsbased explanation of the organization and boundaries of the Mform corporation.viii

As applied to the TNC, the internalization

of cross-border transactions takes place most likely in order to
reduce transaction costs related to exchanges of intermediate
products (especially intangible assets) across borders, thereby
raising global efficiency.

Markets are the preferred method for

transferring intangible assets to foreign locations, but costly
market imperfections require the FDI approach.

Williamson

responds to Hymer's work by agreeing (1981: 1561) that the firm
could choose internalization in order to restrain competition in
addition to or instead of promoting transactional efficiency.
But he argues that the efficiency reason is the more compelling
explanation because of the tendency for international production
to take place in industries experiencing rapid technological
progress, and because the markets for transferring knowledge pose
such difficult problems.

He explicitly states that he has been

dismayed by the popularity of the “antitrust” view that casts the
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largest (including international) corporations in a negative
light by assuming negative welfare consequences from their size
and market share.

According to Williamson, markets for technology/knowledge
are imperfect due to three problems: "recognition, disclosure,
and team organization" (1981: 1562).
on the latter two.

His argument concentrates

The problem with disclosure arises in the

transfer of technology due to the information asymmetry also
recognized by Hymer.

The team organization problem arises when

"new knowledge is diffusely distributed and is poorly defined":
Where the requisite information is
distributed among a number of individuals
all of whom understand their speciality in
only a tacit, intuitive way, a simple
contract to transfer the technology cannot
be devised [1981: 1562].
The disclosure problem would probably require a profitsharing arrangement with monitoring of costs and revenue, and
perhaps monitoring of production.

The disclosure and team

organization problems present the additional difficulty of
establishing procedures to govern joint work by personnel from
two firms.

If the contemplated transaction is of a recurring

type, "complex contracting is apt to give way to direct foreign
investment" (p. 1563).

Therefore, the more complex or new the

technology, the higher are the expected external transaction
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costs, and the more likely is the TNC solution.

The TNC is

explained as a technological pioneer with efficiency-enhancing
properties.
Williamson supports his explanation of the TNC by citing
some evidence that international firms tend to transfer new
technology through FDI, but use licensing and joint ventures to
transfer older technology (1981: 1563, n.41; see also Hennart
1991: 88; Milberg 1998) However, this evidence would seem to be
consistent with an oligopolistic competition explanation also.
New technology is more likely to be the basis of current rent
receipts and of the immediate competitive development of the firm
(as developed in knowledge-based theories of the firm addressed
below), and therefore is more important to guard from rivals.
Thus, Williamson’s TCE-based theory of the multinational
firm follows Coase more closely than those of Hymer and B&C.

If

the firm exists because it functions as a transaction-costminimizing institution, then the TNC exists to perform the same
function across national borders.

Williamson is certainly aware

of competitive conditions that could influence firms’ decisionmaking on many matters, including the choice of ownership of
foreign productive assets.

Therefore, it can only be concluded

that his attempt here is to fashion a theory of the TNC
abstracted from its competitive environment, emulating Coase’s
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1937 methodology of investigation of the firm in isolation from
competition.

Williamson cautioned that “a transaction cost
interpretation” should not necessarily be construed as a “fully
adequate” treatment of the subject (1981: 1557).

More recently,

Williamson has suggested that TCE and evolutionary theories of
the TNC be explored together.

Nevertheless, until recently,

Williamson’s influential methodology has had the effect of
focusing the MNE literature on transaction-cost-based
explanations (Pitelis__).ix

IV. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM, THE THEORY OF COMPETITION, AND THE
TNC
Do we have a theory of the TNC abstracted from its
competitive milieu?

Do we have a theory of the TNC embedded in

its competitive context?

The argument here is that Hymer and

Buckley & Casson offer the latter, essentially a theory of
international competition carried on by oligopolistic firms with
access to sufficient resources to contemplate ownership of
foreign productive resources.

Williamson attempts to offer the

former, following Coase’s methodology, but TCE alone cannot
achieve this goal because it cannot explain the need or even
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reason for a foreign production site.
As formulated, the transaction-cost-based theory of the TNC
assumes that production in two countries is necessary, and then
specifies the most likely form of the advantaged firm's
involvement, i.e., licensing or FDI.

But this theory does not

explain why the firm with the knowledge asset cannot simply
export the product embodying the technology (Ietto-Gillies 1992:
118).

In other words, why must the asset be transferred at all?

As Brainard (1997) observes, the desire or necessity for
internal exploitation of the firm's assets leads to the
possibility of FDI or of exports from the home country, with the
latter presenting the possibility for economies of scale.
In order to explain why foreign production is essential,
resort must be made to strategic considerations with respect to
location (Dunning 1998; Caves 1996: 2; Hennart 1991: 85), such as
foreign laws, regulations or taxes (as recognized by B&C), or
removal of foreign competition (recognized by Hymer), or
advantages to be gained from the foreign location not available
in the home country (Ietto-Gillies; Nolan), or any number of
strategic reasons deriving from the firm's competitive stance in
its industry and its access to resources.

It is not sufficient

to simply assume the existence of import barriers, especially
since in recent decades, international trade barriers have been
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falling while multinational production has been growing (IettoGillies 2005:155; WIR 2005).
John Dunning, the creator of the "OLI eclectic paradigm,"x
laments that, in the TNC literature, location has become the
"neglected factor." (Dunning 1998:45)

He argues that, "given

[the firm's] O[wnership] specific advantages, the critical choice
of a multi-activity firm is whether it should internalize its
intermediate product markets within its home country or in a
foreign country ..." (Dunning 1998: 45).

In fact, Brainard's

(1997) empirical work finds that the ratio of firms' research and
development expenditures to sales (an indication of technological
intensity and the existence of technological intangible assets)
explains exports slightly better than it explains foreign
production.

In other words, the choice of the location of

production must be explained.
Again, Coase’s transaction-cost theory of the firm is an
attempt to explain why the firm exists, and the ownership
boundaries of the firm (Conner 1991: 123; Coase 1937; Williamson
1981), based upon the relative costs of market and internal
coordination of productive services.

As such, it is treated in

abstraction from the goals and activities of the firm in the
context of its competitive environment.

TCE theory, assuming the

existence of the firm, nevertheless adopts Coase’s methodology to
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explain the ownership boundaries of the international firm.

Like

Coase, Williamson seems to treat the theory of the multinational
firm in abstraction from its competitive environment.

This

methodology does not ask how the TNC acquired the asset or
advantage that gives rise to the transfer problem, nor does it
ask how the firm's exploitation of its asset will affect other
firms in the industry and its own competitive stance in the
industry (Dunning 1993: 81).

Nor does it ask whether the firm's

best competitive strategy against its rivals requires putting
aside the problem of transaction costs in order to address
another factor that will more effectively improve its overall
competitive position (Cantwell 1991:25; Pessali 1999: 267).

But

surely these factors affect the choice of production location.
Knickerbocker (1973) found a tendency for firms operating within
a loose oligopoly to follow the industry leader, setting up
foreign subsidiaries in locations pioneered by the leader firm.
This was portrayed as a defensive competitive strategy, adopted
in order to avoid losing out on any advantages the leader might
receive or create in the new location, but probably not cost—
effective, at least at the outset.

Vernon (1993: 59) argues that

defensive competitive reasons, and not necessarily cost-conscious
ones, explain much of the international production that has taken
place since the end of the Second World War.
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When the firm's competitive environment and strategic
considerations are introduced, the inquiry has shifted from a
theory of the firm to a theory of competition.

The difference

between them is in the level of abstraction characteristic of
each.

Specifically, the theory of the firm is treated at a

higher level of abstraction than is the theory of competition.
The theory of the firm represents an attempt to explain the
features of the firm that permit low-cost resource allocation,
while putting aside the effects of the competitive environment.
Therefore, introducing the location decision to explain the
existence of the international firm (which of necessity
introduces the panoply of strategic competitive considerations)
takes the inquiry out of the realm of the theory of the firm, and
into the realm of the theory of competition.
Cantwell (1991: 17) describes the difference between the two
as emanating from two different levels of analysis: the
mesoeconomic (focusing on the interaction between firms in an
industry) and microeconomic (focusing on the individual firm).
The point made here is that the latter cannot serve as a theory
of the TNC without reference to the former, because it cannot
explain when production should take place in the home or foreign
location.

Even if the location issue arises due to a non-

strategic factor such as trade barriers, which could affect all
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foreign firms equally, each firm's response will depend upon its
competitive environment.
Once this broader competition question is introduced, it is
clear that there are a number of reasons why a firm might choose
international production, and that these reasons may have nothing
to do with transaction costs, or may constitute considerations in
addition to transaction costs.

TCE purports to explain common

ownership of internationally dispersed productive assets, but
another possible explanation is that the firm establishes a
foreign subsidiary instead of a contractual relationship with a
foreign firm because it wants to maintain a monopoly on its
knowledge assets for as long as possible in order to garner the
maximum possible rents, as is recognized by Hymer, B&C, and in
most versions of “internalization” theory.

This motive for

internalizing cross-border transactions is not based on
coordination costs and is not necessarily consistent with
improved efficiency.
The problem with TCE as a theory of the international firm
is that it explains only what it assumes, i.e., that the firm's
motive in establishing foreign production is to economize on the
cost of transferring assets.

By abstracting away from the

factors that influence the decision about production location,
Williamson attempts to explain the TNC on the basis of the

23

internal and external costs of coordinating resources only.
Once consideration of location factors has led to the
determination that foreign production instead of domestic
production will more readily secure the firm's goals, it is
possible to consider whether TCE explains the appropriate form or
mode of the firm's relationship to the foreign production
endeavor, i.e., ownership, licensing, joint venture, or other
contractual form.

Here, TCE explains that, when the firm is to

contribute costly-to-transfer assets to the foreign production,
the method likely to economize on transaction costs is often FDI.
Yet there is a great deal of literature describing and
explaining the recent growth of international joint ventures (Yan
1998) and international networks of cooperating firms (Mutinelli
and Piscitello 1998; Belussi and Arcangeli 1998; Nolan; IettoGillies).

A number of motives have been put forth to explain

these alliances, including risk-sharing, cost-sharing, the
growing importance of inter-sectoral technology, the search for
new products, penetration of markets, and organizational learning
opportunities (Hagedoorn 1996: 601-605; Belussi and Arcangeli
1998), and not just the cost of the transfer of intangible
assets.

To the extent that firms choose these cooperative forms,

it must be the case that the expected gains to the firm's
competitive position from risk-sharing or learning or etc.
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outweigh the expected gains from minimizing transaction costs via
internalization.
That is, it is possible that firms choosing a cooperative
form of international participation are pursuing goals other than
the transfer of knowledge to a foreign production site, which is
the goal analyzed by TCE analysis.

If so, then TCE explains the

choice of the form of international involvement only in
circumstances where the nature of markets for the transfer of
knowledge constitutes the most important factor.
once again, TCE explains only what it assumes.

In other words,

It contributes

consideration of a factor in the multinational decision that
might have been overlooked before TCE was developed, but it alone
does not explain the choice.

The competitive position and goals

of the firm, its access to resources and its strategies, and the
managers' perceptions of these factors, do.

TCE provides one

explanation among many for international production as is
recognized in internalization theory.

It cannot stand alone as a

theory of the TNC.
In the discussion so far, TCE explains the TNC only given
that the state of competition and the firm's resources require
foreign production instead of export, and given that the ability
to minimize transaction costs is the most important issue in the
decision about how to exploit its assets in other countries.

Yet

25

even this limited role for TCE is overstated, once a dynamic
concept of competition is introduced.

V. Knowledge-based theories of the firm combined with
transaction-cost theory of the TNC
Hymer, Buckley & Casson, and Williamson crafted theories of
the TNC that were very influential in the 1970s, 1980s and into
the 1990s.

The 1990s and 2000s have marked the arrival of a new

genre of theories aiming to augment or displace TCE and
internalization theories of the firm and the TNC.

The newer

theories include the resource-based view (RBV) (Kay), the
competencies approach to both the firm and the TNC (Hodgson;
Prahalad and Hamel), the evolutionary or knowledge-based theory
of the TNC (Kogut and Zander), the theory of foreign
technological accumulation (Cantwell), the theory of the
innovative enterprise (Lazonick), and the theory of the TNC as a
master of multiple national “regulatory regimes” (Ietto-Gillies).
For the most part, however, the knowledge theories of the firm
leave intact the transaction-cost theory of the TNC.

This

approach isn’t really challenged until very recently (see IettoGillies 2005; Nolan et al. 2002, both discussed below).xi
By focusing on the internal impetus to firm growth based on
the firm’s resources and ongoing collective learning, the
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knowledge-based theories challenge a fundamental assumption
underlying the theories relying on coordination costs: the
assumption that markets are the preferred venue for transferring
knowledge assets except for the costs associated with inter-firm
relationships.

Treating knowledge assets as a strategic,

competitive advantage in the fight for market share is ignored by
the TCE-based theory because it ignores the creation of the
ownership advantage:
developed?

Where did it come from? Or how was it

WHAT DOES THE FIRM DO?

1998:188; KZ 1993:638; B&C 1976:69)

What do TNCs do? (Hodgson,
In addition to allocating

resources, they produce and sell goods and services and compete
in order to be able to continue to do so on a remunerative basis.
In the newer theories, firm and MNE advantages are the results
from past investments in R&D, in the creation of an integrated
team of skilled individuals, the creation of an information
transmission network within the organization, and the like.

The

newer approaches have, not coincidentally, coincided with a new
appreciation of Edith Penrose’s (1959) work on the internal
impetus to growth of the firm. Her book had introduced
cumulative, collective learning within the firm as an essential
driver of the expansion of the firm and the path-dependent
direction of expansion, including foreign production.
The literature on competition on the basis of knowledge
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assets identifies these assets not only as inputs into final
products, but as the fundamental means of competition for the
firm (Navaretti et al. 2004; Ietto-Gillies 2002; Cantwell 1989;
Conner 1991).

That is, the ability to produce knowledge, and to

continue that ability into the future, is treated as a
competitive advantage and strategy of the firm.

This implies

that knowledge assets are more likely to be exploited within the
firm and not for sale, even if markets could deliver full rents
and minimize transaction costs to the owners of the assets.

This

is because internal development of know-how provides the means
for developing knowledge assets in the future, and therefore
secures a basis for successful competition in the future.

Edith

Penrose's work on the growth of the firm emphasizes the
development or evolution of the firm as it grows, within its
competitive context.

This takes place on the basis of the

special talents developed by the firm's personnel in the process
of working with the firm's physical assets.

As Penrose

emphasized, the acquisition of new knowledge or know-how opens
new possibilities that didn’t exist or weren’t recognized in an
earlier period.

The introduction of these dynamic competition

concerns could explain Williamson's (1981: 1563, n.41) and
Hennart's (1991: 88) observations, noted above, that new
technology tends to be transferred through a foreign subsidiary,
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while older technology is transferred via licensing or joint
venture.

In the new approach to technological competition, the

transaction cost problem is irrelevant or secondary to the goal
of maintaining privileged access to unique competitive assets for
further development.xii
When considering knowledge-based competition, it is useful
to think of the firm as a producer of joint products: the final
product which it sells, and the learning or knowledge asset
developed along with the final product that makes the product
competitive against the products of rival firms and creates new
competitive opportunities.

The knowledge product is not

developed for sale, but for internal use, preparing the firm for
the next stage of competition.

The firm is thus an evolving

entity, reproducing itself from one period to the next, but
enhanced or changed by the learning-cum-production of the
previous period.

E. H. Chamberlin criticized the focus of IO

economics of the 1950s-1960s on the industry as the unit of
analysis, arguing that the "product" is constantly changing,
making industry an inchoate concept (Ekelund and Hebert 1990).
By extension, the plasticity of Chamberlin's concept of the
"product" implies that the firm that is changing or developing
its product is simultaneously changing itself.
This dynamic competition approach challenges the assumption
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at the heart of TCE/internalization theory that markets would be
the preferred route for international transfer of assets but for
market imperfections.
2002).

(Navaretti et al. 2004; Ietto-Gillies

The function of the firm is to produce new unique

collective knowledge that is difficult to copy and embodied in
new products, processes, or new organizational routines, as the
basis for competition and survival.

Hierarchy is not the only

institutional difference between the firm and the market, nor is
it the most important.

The focus switches from the transfer of

knowledge assets to the production of knowledge assets.
Although Penrose’s theory took into account both internal
and external factors explaining the growth of the firm, the
contribution that most influenced the knowledge-based theories
was her explanation of the internal drivers of growth.

To

Penrose, the firm is a “bundle of resources”(____) consisting of
human beings and physical assets that provide productive
services.

She argues that, since the interaction of the firm’s

personnel with their capital equipment and materials over time
leads to the production of new knowledge, understanding, and
capabilities, this process in effect creates new unused services
that can be obtained from existing resources, and can be put to
profitable use.

But Penrose does not focus exclusively on the

internal firm processes.

Rather, these internal developments
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color management’s view regarding external opportunities, and
vice versa.

This leads to new endeavors, and acquisition of

additional resources as needed to pursue these new endeavors,
eventually taking the firm into product and/or geographical
diversification based upon the collective, cumulative learning
taking place.

In Penrose, international production is an

inevitable part of the growth of the firm that has mastered a
competitive knowledge-based evolutionary path. Some of the
Penrose-inspired theory of the firm and TNC is reviewed briefly
below.
(A) The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm has
emerged as a potential alternative to the
internalization/transaction-cost theories (Pitelis, et al.
2000).

Like Penrose’s work, it emphasizes the firm’s

activities as a path-dependent or path-influenced process
of creation of knowledge based on the characteristics of
the firm’s initial bundle of resources. (Wernerfelt 1984;
Kay 2000). Kay (2000) suggests that RBV can be used to
create a theory of the TNCxiii by weaving RBV with
internalization theory.

Like Penrose, he treats the MNE as

a bundle of resources, and groups these resources as
intangible assets that the firm may possess in (1)
marketing, (2) production, (3) R&D, and (4)home country-
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based knowledge.

He suggests that it is the strength or

weakness an individual firm has in these areas that will
determine the direction of new activities.

The direction

of expansion is defined as a choice among (a) further
product specialization, (b) product diversification, or (c)
selling abroad.

In this approach, the richest resource

linkages between the firm and its new activity are to be
found in domestic expansion, based either on further
specialization or diversification, since all four
categories of intangible assets may be exploited more
intensively.

Exporting is less desirable since the firm’s

expertise in production and R&D only could be exploited.
Presumably, its marketing and home country-based knowledge
would not be useful.

Therefore, exporting is desirable

only if there are limits to domestic expansion, such as
market saturation or antitrust regulatory difficulties.
The internationalization option is the least desirable,
since the firm’s production assets could not be exploited,
although its R&D advantages could.

Kay does not elaborate

the factors that determine the choice between export and
FDI.

He concludes that the RBV approach shows that

multinational expansion is a solution deriving from a
“weakened” home position for a firm that has no further
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opportunities for domestic resource linkages.

And the firm

has no justification for international expansion without
strong research-based assets (151).
According to Kay, once foreign production is chosen as the
appropriate direction of expansion, the assumption of ownership
of the foreign assets is dropped, and the question of the mode of
expansion arises.

That is, the firm may also consider

cooperative modes such as subcontracting, licensing, joint
venture or franchise.

Here, says Kay,

we have a ready-made tool kit for analyzing mode in the
industrial organization literature, namely transaction cost
economics…. This framework expresses choice of mode in
comparative institutional terms and considers the
efficiency implications of alternative market and
organizational arrangements.” (154)(emphasis supplied)
Thus, Kay embraces the coordination cost/efficiency approach to
explain the internationalization step, and portrays this step as
a last resort.

Kay adopts the broader approach to coordination

costs found in the internalization literature, including
appropriability issues, and concludes that both RBV and some form
of internalization analysis are necessary to adequately analyze
the expansion decision; RBV determines direction, and
internalization analysis determines mode.
Kay is clearly not trying to fashion a theory of the MNE
abstracted from its competitive environment.

His RBV approach

considers competitive factors with respect to direction of
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expansion, and his broad internalization approach includes
appropriability issues.

Therefore, on the question of why a firm

OWNS foreign productive assets, which is the question that must
be answered, Kay considers interfirm coordination costs.

The

possibility that a host of other competitive/strategic issues may
impact the mode choice, such as access to technology or methods
or products, or risk-spreading or geographic location of rivals
is not recognized.

Kay’s theory of the TNC within its

competitive environment inexplicably gives pride of place among
the determinants of FDI to coordination costs and the goal of
efficiency with respect to this narrow category.

By focusing too

intently on Penrose’s treatment of internal forces for expansion,
Kay ignores the possibility of acquiring resources or other
competitive advantages from another location.
(B) The evolutionaryxiv theory of the TNC by Kogut and Zander
(K&Z 1993, 2003) is critical of the importance assumed by
transaction-cost/internalization approaches in the theory of the
firm and the TNC.

K&Z variously refer to their work as a theory

of the firm, theory of the growth of the firm, and a theory of
the TNC.

They critique RBV and internalization theories;

nevertheless, they combine some evolutionary and Penrosian
resource-based ideas with an internalization approach.
K&Z portray the firm as a social community assembled in
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order to create and transform tacit collective knowledge into
profitable goods and services.

The firm develops routines, codes

and know-how in order to do so efficiently (631). K&Z argue
(2003:10) that the firm’s advantage over the market does not
involve transaction costs, but is composed of employee
identification with the social group which enhances coordination,
communication, and learning.

They distinguish their approach

from RBV by criticizing the latter’s “excessively” inward focus
on the likely direction of expansion, arguing that the evolution
of resources will always be influenced by the external forces of
market competition.
For K&Z, the understanding and cooperation elicited from the
firm’s personnel by identification with this social community
creates the competitive or ownership advantages or capabilities
secured by the firm.

These capabilities, of different strengths

in different firms, make transfers within the firm less costly
than interfirm transfers, due to investments in “codifying and
teaching complex knowledge to recipients….” (630).

The MNC

appears due to its superior efficiency vis-a-vis other firms in
the (internalized) transfer and recombination of tacit knowledge
across national borders (K&Z 1993: 625-27).

K&Z challenge the

frequent assumption in the transaction-cost literature that there
is a public good aspect of knowledge: i.e., that it can be
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transferred at zero marginal cost, but hard to protect, such that
market failure requires internalization (see, e.g. B&C: 628).
Thus, their criticism of the B&C internalization approach is that
all firms do not face the same transaction costs.

Furthermore,

the issue created by the existence of transaction costs is not
primarily the problem of choosing a governance mechanism (market
vs. firm), but the different capabilities of individual firms for
achieving routinized communication of difficult-to-transfer
knowledge.

Therefore, the mode of transfer of knowledge, whether

internal or external to the firm, depends on the unique
capabilities created by each firm.xv
This resembles an internalization approach, adding the
recognition of different transaction costs facing individual
firms based on their past investments and performances, and
rejecting the Williamson emphasis on market failure and
contracting problems.

K&Z provide a more detailed behavioral

focus on production, i.e., transferring and transforming
collective, tacit knowledge into profitable products and
services.

The transfer of knowledge in this view is part of a

stage of production in which ideas are made accessible to members
of a group that will transform them into products.

Firms that

are more efficient at this become MNEs because they are most
likely to be able to do the same across national borders.

But
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WHY can’t they export?

WHY do they have to locate production in

the foreign market?
K&Z go beyond the problems involved with asset transfer, and
embrace a more holistic approach by, like Penrose, emphasizing
that the firm’s problem is not just to transfer knowledge, but to
use it as its platform for the creation of future advantages and
expansion, i.e., as the basis for competition.

Further, as K&Z

develop this point, they begin to refer to the role of the twoway transfer of information that can result from opening
operations in a foreign country, and thus open the discussion to
a recognition too rare in the economics literature that FDI can
take place in order to acquire advantages, and not just to
transfer them from the parent firm.

According to K&Z, the

acquisition and recombination of knowledge to create future
competitive possibilities are less likely if the firm relies on
licensing instead of foreign production (640).

Here, a reason

for foreign production is introduced, although it is not clear
why the acquisition of knowledge from abroad requires a
production presence in a foreign country.

Implicitly,

production-specific learning-by-doing is suggested.
K&Z essentially present a theory of firm growth and
development (like Penrose); when the firm arrives at the
international step, which is assumed to be a negative function of
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the attractiveness of domestic opportunities, it internalizes
foreign production in order to transfer tacit assets to the
foreign country and/or to acquire new capabilities.

But the

other possible competitive reasons for international production
are ignored.
(C) Lazonick’s theory of the social conditions of innovative
enterprise (SCIE) (2003; 2002) presents a theory of firm
development that emulates, criticizes and extends Penrose’s work,
but does not address the multinational firm.

Nevertheless, it is

the approach to the firm that most successfully rejects
transaction cost economics and the static, constrained
optimization methodology underlying TCE.

Lazonick’s innovative

firm does not passively respond to external constraints such as
transaction costs. Instead, it acquires financial commitment to a
process of innovation with an uncertain outcome in order to
transform products, markets and technological and other
“conditions that might otherwise impose constraints on its
ability to generate higher quality, lower cost products.” (2002:
251)
[T]he transaction-cost approach…ultimately relies on
exogenously determined “sunk costs” – Williamson’s “asset
specificity” – to explain the scale and scope of the modern
industrial enterprise. …Instead of viewing the firm’s
assets as exogenously determined, a theory of innovative
enterprise analyses them as strategic investment. (P. 250)
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But Lazonick’s criticism (and others’, e.g. Nolan et al.
2002) make clear the fundamental limitations of the constrained
optimization/comparative statics approach adopted by most of the
extant theories.

For Lazonick, Schumpeterian innovation leading

to transformation of the firm’s environment is the essence of
competition.

Innovation creates an evolutionary development of

the competitive environment, so that specific competitive
challenges change over time.

By recognizing that the development

of firm competitive assets transforms its environment, he more
successfully converts the knowledge-based approach into a dynamic
theory of competition and firm development over time.
The social conditions necessary to accomplish innovation,
according to Lazonick, are organizational integration, financial
commitment, and strategic control.

The organizational

integration concept (similar to K&Z’s emphasis on the necessity
for the creation of commitment to the enterprise by individuals)
recognizes the need for incentives for individuals to engage in
collective learning that will enable transformative action.

The

financial commitment is necessary to finance the needed time for
development, and strategic control is the power to allocate
resources so as to achieve the firm’s innovative goals. (p. 252)
Like Penrose, Lazonick recognizes that the firm’s cumulative
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learning and development require not only the continual
development of the firm’s resources, but also the necessity for
complementary investments in new resources. (p. 271)

This means

innovations or capabilities from outside the firm are added to
the firm’s cumulative knowledge development.xvi
Penrose, Lazonick, and others have also recognized the
“growing importance of strategic alliances and networks of firms
in the innovation process,” requiring an inquiry into “the
organizational learning and economic performance of…inter-firm
alliances.” (271)

Lazonick notes “large literatures on supplier

relations and strategic alliances… demonstrate that innovation
can occur through cooperation across legally independent firms as
well as within a firm….” (2003: 56) With this recognition, it
seems that the RBV and evolutionary approaches to the firm to
date constitute only special cases of a broader knowledge
approach to intra-firm and inter-firm structures of learning,
competition and cooperation.

This brings into question whether

the long-standing focus on the ownership boundaries of the TNC is
sufficient, given that the inquiry is about non-market
institutional control over the allocation of some portion of
global resources.

Lazonick himself does not extend his analysis

to the TNC.
(D) Nolan et al. (2002) and Ietto-Gillies (2002A, 2002B,
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2005) address the TNC by abandoning the focus on the transfer of
knowledge and transactions costs, and indeed on the theory of the
firm, to introduce the idea that there are benefits deriving
specifically from foreign operations.

In addition they address

the growing practice of externalization of previous firm
functions, including outsourcing, sub-contracting, joint
ventures, and the like.

(See also Milberg 2004; Howells 1999)

And finally, Ietto-Gillies reintroduces the subject of the
hierarchical nature of the typical firm, a concept seemingly lost
in the focus on the collective learning function of the firm.
Nolan et al. (and Milberg 2004) emphasize a “global business
revolution,” involving a few giant corporations “dominat[ing]
each sector of the global economy.”

Their competitive advantages

include sizable global market shares and globally recognized
brands based on past investments. (Nolan 91-92)

Thus Nolan

places TNCs at the core of international oligopolistic
competition for contested resources.

Ietto-Gillies emphasizes

the strategic advantages internationalization extends to the TNC,
including the learned capability to manage assets across national
“regulatory regimes,” opening up possibilities for spreading
risks, engaging in transfer pricing, threatening rivals, and
gaining bargaining power relative to labor and home-country and
host-country governments. Here, in effect, is the
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internationalized version of Lazonick’s innovative enterprise,
transforming its environment across national boundaries.

It is

recognized specifically that the regulatory environment, and not
just the economic and competitive environment, offers
possibilities for transformation of constraints.

National and

supra-national governance institutions are therefore targets for
TNC influence in the effort to control resources.

This

connection between TNCs and governance institutions is a concept
acknowledged in the international political economy (IPE) and
business literatures, but mostly absent from the economics-based
theoretical TNC literature (with exceptions, such as Sugden
____).

Yet, influence over regulatory policy extends the TNC’s

influence on resource allocation in a way not recognized in the
theory of the firm, and with genuine economic consequences.

The

push to extend American intellectual property rights conventions
around the globe is just one example (Perelman 2003; Doshi 2004);
the broader effort to standardize international rules regarding
trade and investment is another.
Nolan and Ietto-Gillies also recognize the ongoing
externalization of many non-core firm functions, further
destroying the coincidence of ownership boundaries with the power
to influence resource allocation.

One example is the Dell

company, which “exercises considerable administrative control
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over stages of production it does not own.” (Langlois 2003: 376)
The literature is full of similar examples.
1999; Azoulay 2004)

(See, e.g., Howells

Nolan refers to the “external firm” as “the

sphere over which conscious coordination of resource allocation
takes place….”(101)

While the focus on the “external firm”

questions the amount of theoretical attention paid to ownership
boundaries, this does not mean that there is no value in
investigating the determinants of those boundaries.

In fact, it

is possible to explain the ownership boundaries, externalization,
and the TNC’s relationship with labor by focusing more closely on
the process of standardization as a part of the process of
innovation.
According to Nolan et al., externalization occurs because
new information technology investments have made “superincreased” monitoring possible.

Like Lazonick, Nolan emphasizes

that firms have worked to transform their pre-existing
constraints (transactions-related or otherwise).

This renders

ownership of some foreign productive activities an unnecessarily
invested way to control economic activities in which they have an
interest.

Milberg (2004) has examined the pattern of vertical

disintegration of production resulting from the outsourcing of
supplier functions in sub-industries that utilize standardized
technologies not core to the outsourcing firm.

These sub-
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industries are subject to vigorous competition and experience low
profit margins. These conditions are likely to exist in
productive activities utilizing relatively non-unique assets and
standardized production methods, which are the source of the
competitive and profit conditions.
Milberg emphasizes that firms retain ownership of unique
assets/activities because of their rent-producing properties.
Nolan focuses on the monitorability of outsourced functions.
(See also Azoulay 2004; Howells 1999)
continuum of innovatory activities.

The two are part of a

What renders a technology

“standardized,” and no longer unique and inimitable, no longer a
source of rents, with more easily measured output quality?
Introducing the dynamic element, the process of standardization
is the process of refining know-how until the once tacit
understanding involved becomes familiar, routine and accessible
to many.

This is the result of past investments made by firms to

make the technology and its utilization more reliable, and
therefore easier to manage, along with investments in new
measurement tools.

These investments contribute to the creation

of new markets supplying functions not previously obtainable
outside the firm’s ownership boundaries.

Externalization of

standardized functions may be said to be due to low transaction
costs in markets for easily measurable activities, but the
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transaction costs are endogenously determined by firms’
competitive investments in innovation and standardization. (see
Milberg 2004:61; see also Langlois 2003)

These principles can

also help to explain the hierarchical division of labor within
the firm that Ietto-Gilies re-introduces.
The cooperative learning approach to the firm seemed to have
abandoned attention to the typical hierarchical nature of the
firm until Ietto-Gillies cited the motive to subdue labor
bargaining power as one driver of international production.
Lazonick had also cautioned that the collective, developmental
approach to the firm is typically limited to the managerial
group, at least in the United States, except perhaps in narrow,
skill-based industries such as information technology.

In TNCs

originating outside the U.S., the extent of the collective
learning approach may vary.
The network literature suggests a method for characterizing
the hierarchy of labor within the firm, and that is to employ the
subjective judgment/measurement differentiation.

Azoulay (2004)

and Howells (1999) address the distinction between research labor
within the firm and labor in outsourced research functions.
Howells suggests a “core and periphery” workforce, with subcontracting for routine, standardized low value-added work, and
in-house labor devoted to the firm’s “critical” technology, i.e.,
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labor whose performance requires appraisal or judgment since no
objective measurements are available. (pp. 22-25)
also emphasizes judgment.)

(Hodgson 1998

Azoulay (2004) emphasizes the

difference between easily monitorable tasks performed in “data
sweatshops” by “data mules” and knowledge production: “the
establishment of novel conceptual categories, hypotheses, and
causal associations.” (1591)

The latter is harder to measure,

resulting in subjective performance evaluations.

Extending these concepts to the division of labor within the
firm, labor whose performance is judged, not measured, based on a
variety of changing interrelated factors, is more likely to be a
part of the learning/developing group.

Labor whose performance

is more easily measured using standardized tools and considered
to be more easily replaceable is less likely to be in the
development group because the firm invests relatively little
firm-specific knowledge in this group.

This is also the labor

more likely to be outsourced if and when markets are created in
the services provided by this labor.

In other words, there may

be within the firm a continuum of activities differentiable on
the basis of the degree to which performance can be measured
objectively.

If and when activities are outsourced is a matter

of technological and institutional development that results from
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firms’ competitive investments.

Using the same analytical method

to address the division of labor within and outside the firm’s
boundaries emphasizes the hierarchy that exists within both firms
and markets.

VI. CONCLUSION: what do TNCs do?
What do (firms) TNCs do?

They produce goods and services in

more than one country for anticipated profitable remuneration.
They compete in order to remove threats and enhance their
capabilities for continuing to produce and sell, using
innovation, the acquisition of appropriate finance and other
resources and the securing of necessary supplies (which may or
may not include a market interface).

In this competitive

process, they transform themselves, markets, the nature and
location of production, and the environment, including political
institutions and governance.

The anticipation of remuneration or

rents comes from branding and differentiated and somewhat
inimitable knowledge or capabilities which can be developed and
supplemented over time through the production, selling, and
resource acquisition experience.

The choice of location of

production, and whether resources are owned or contracted, is a
strategic issue, which of necessity changes with historical
changes in firms, technology and the evolution of markets and the
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competitive environment.

Ietto-Gillies argues that the choice of

network configurations, i.e., the network that includes the
firm’s owned assets and contracted assets, depends on “strategic
objective, efficiency constraints and perceived scope for
control.” (2002B: 40; see also Lazonick on strategic control:
252)

Some competitive methods may improve efficiency, but others

will secure the basis for collecting rents by extending
proprietary control.
The international scope brings access to unique foreign
resources that may be folded into the firm’s existing competitive
advantages.

It extends the reach of the TNC’s control over a

portion of global resources, thus limiting control by others with
different goals, including rivals, governing bodies and labor.
Ownership-based control is unlikely when the foreign assets are
not unique enough to yield significant rents or would unduly
raise risk by concentrating too many of the firm’s resources on a
single competitive opportunity.

Here, subcontracting or

outsourcing suffices to extend control over non-owned resources.
TCE focuses attention on a subset of competitive tools in
unique circumstances.

Knowledge-based theories, to the extent

that they adopt transaction-cost reasoning to explain ownership
of foreign production, are subject to the same problem.
Transaction costs are undoubtedly an important consideration, one
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among many, with regard to multinational expansion.
The knowledge-based literature, when freed of the
constraints of the TCE methodology, demonstrates more clearly
that there are many possible reasons to operate internationally.
They add to the fleshing out of the institutional
characteristics of the firm and the TNC and of the nature and
process of competition.

They are more likely to focus on the

dynamic development of competitive advantages instead of simply
the transfer of advantages.

They are more likely to help to take

analysis of the TNC out of the static, constrained-optimization
methodology that draws attention away from the competitive
activities that transform the global environment.
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In the literature on this topic, no distinction is made between the firm and
the specifically corporate form. I follow that practice here, noting the
additional privileges accruing to the corporation due to limited liability and
less costly access to finance.
ii
I use the term TNC interchangeably with multinational corporation (MNC),
multinational enterprise (MNE) and international firm, as is the usual
practice.
iii
As Langlois (2003) notes, the distinction between markets and hierarchies
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has become dated since 1937. The differences between firms and markets can not
be characterized so starkly along the hierarchy dimension. This point is
addressed in the conclusion of this paper.
iv
v

Hymer’s 1960 dissertation was published in 1976.

Successful foreign production would entail learning costs with

respect to a foreign culture, laws, regulation, and language, and
local firms would have the advantage of already knowing how to
conduct business in this environment (Hymer 1976: 28, 34).
vi

Dunning created a “framework” for understanding international production as
a function of a firm’s Ownership advantages (often intangible assets),
Location advantages, and Internalization advantages.

vii

Hymer believed that integration of "previously remote markets"

would improve the efficiency of global resource allocation (Hymer
1976: 221).

Kindleberger (1969) developed this theme at more

length (pp. 32, 187).
viiiviii

Most of Williamson's (1981) article is devoted to the

argument that the modern M-form of corporate organization evolved
in order to minimize transaction costs that arise from
circumstances characterized by bounded rationality and
opportunism.

He argues that the M-form made the TNC possible by

reducing the information management burden at the
planning/strategic level of the firm.
ix

A great deal of work on the TNC has focused on the so-called “hold-up”
problem that could occur when a party to a contract makes investments in
specialized assets that have little market value outside the contract. See
Holmstrom 1998.

x

Dunning has proposed the OLI paradigm to explain the level and

pattern of international production.

In each case, the firm

instituting foreign production must possess an "Ownership" or
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competitive advantage such as a patent; the country that provides
the site must offer some "Location advantage," such as unique
resources or an attractive market (requiring localized production);
and

the

firm's

advantage

is

of

a

type

"Internalizing" production within the firm.

best

exploited

by

See, e.g., Dunning

1993: 81.
xi

An exception is John Cantwell’s (1991) work on the theory of technological
accumulation.
xii
Indeed, Waldman and Jensen (2001) note research showing that managers rank
secrecy above patenting as the preferred method for maintaining this exclusive
access.
xiii

He notes, however, that Penrose saw no need for a separate

theory of the TNC since she saw geographical diversification as
just one part of the firm diversification that accompanies growth.
The establishment of foreign subsidiaries or branches is, for the parent
company, not essentially different from the establishment of subsidiaries or
branches in its own country. To be sure, greater allowance for risk must be
made,…. But the new expansion is part of the process of growth of the parent
company…. (Kay 2000:144; Penrose 1956:225-26).
xiv
Kogut and Zander base their work on the evolutionary approach to the firm
developed by Nelson and Winter (1982).
xv
It is not entirely clear how a firm without these capabilities can achieve
better transfer results through market intermediation. Perhaps the default
option is no transfer at all.
xvi
Lazonick updates Penrose by describing how the evolution of the US stock
market over the last few decades and the role of stock options in corporate
governance have destroyed the social conditions favoring organizational
integration in the US that was typical of industrial enterprises when Penrose
was writing her book. Lazonick recognizes the ability of firms based on
“’narrow and concentrated’ skill bases of highly educated and specialized
personnel,” such as the pharmaceutical industry, to achieve organizational
integration. (p. 271)

